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En su guerra contra los saharauis, Marruecos beneficiaba del apoyo de Estados Unidos en materia de inteligencia.

En una entrevista con el rey Hasán II, el embajador americano en Rabat declaró que "en el campo de la inteligencia, Estados Unidos hizo por Marruecos más que a ningún otro país".

El 10 de diciembre de 1984, Hasán II recibió al embajador USA en Rabat para pedirle que transmita un mensaje verbal a Reagan. El contenido de este mensaje es: "América sabe que puede hacer lo que apetezca en Marruecos. Marruecos os acordó acceso y tránsito, un programa de ejercicio militar activo y acceso a los buques de guerra, un permiso para extender vuestra estación de radio "Voz de América", y muchos otros programas. Me pregunto yo : qué habeis hecho para Marruecoa a cambio? Valoro las estrechas relaciones que tengo con los líderes de Estados Unidos y aprecio los numerosos gestos de amistad que recibo, pero estoy decepcionado al constatar que esta amistad es raramente respaldada con la sustancia correspondiente. Qué va a hacer América? Teneis que elegir!"

Se constata en los documentos desclasificados por la CIA que los satélites de observación americanos focalizaron el Sáhara Occidental a partir de la operación de Guelta del 13 de octubre de 1981 en la que el Polisario utilizó por primera vez armamento sofisticado.

Hasán II, dominado por el pánico, para conseguir una ayuda sustancial de sus aliados americanos, franceses y saudíes, pretendió que la utilización de los misiles SAM-6 por los saharauis era imposible sin el asesoramiento de técnicos extranjeros. Rabat pidió explicaciones a la Unión Soviética sobre el "uso de misiles antiaéreos soviéticos operados por elementos no africanos que ayudan a los guerrilleros y que son tan sofisticados que no pueden ser utilizados por técnicos africanos".

David J. Dean, Teniente Coronel del ejército del aire americano, en su libro "El papel de las fuerzas aéreas en los conflictos de baja intensidad", dice que el ataque de Guelta "fue otro punto de inflexión en la evolución de esta larga e indecisa guerra. El Polisario atacó a los a la guarnición marroquí de 2.600 hombres con un contingente de 3000 hombres. Además de los habituales "Órganos de Stalin", el Polisario trajo consigo dos nuevos tipos de armas: los tanques T-54 y T-55 y los misiles tierra-aire SA-6". 

"Los Estados Unidos habían estado adoptando una postura muy positiva hacia Marruecos. Un año en que ocurrió el desastre de Guelta Zemmour en octubre de 1981. A la luz de estos cambios en la posición de los Estados Unidos, probablemente el rey Hassan consideró que su petición de ayuda contra el nuevo y sofisticado SA-6 no pasaría desapercibida. La aparición de los SA-6 en Marruecos fue una dramática mejora para las fuerzas del Polisario y tuvo un devastador impacto en la capacidad de Marruecos para seguir cosechando éxitos en el campo de batalla. Los marroquíes se dirigieron a los Estados Unidos con la esperanza de obtener una asistencia inmediata", añade David Dean.

Dean señala que "los marroquíes necesitaban información: ¿Dónde estaban los SA-6? ¿Cuántos había? ¿Cuál era la capacidad del Polisario para restaurarlos?".

Constatando las pocas posiblidades que tienen los Estados Unidos para ayudar a los pilotos marroquíes a luchar contra los misiles SA-6, Dean señala que "los Estados Unidos tenían la capacidad de proporcionar importante información a los marroquíes acerca de los SA-6" y añade que "debido al interés de muy alto nivel en ayudar a los marroquíes, Estados Unidos hizo un esfuerzo concertado para localizar la posición de los SA-6 utilizados por el Polisario".

Los documentos secretos de la CIA muestran que, efectivamente, en ese momento, bajo la administración Reagan, los americanos empezaron a proporcionar información detallada sobre la localización de los misiles saharauis, lo que permitió a los marroquíes atacarlos cuando no estaban en posición de combate. 

Unos días después de la operación de Guelta, las unidades antiaéreas saharauis se instalaron en Uad Ternit. Apenas un mes después fueron atacadas. Se trasladaron a Uad Dirit donde en fueron de nuevo atacadas. Lo mismo sucedió cuando se instaló en Uad Ben Zacka. 

El 4 deMayo de 1984, durante la operación de Sual, a la puesta del sol, la unidad antiaérea apagó los radares para un reposo hasta la mañana siguiente. Unos minutos más tarde, fue atacada por la aviación marroquí ocasionando varios desgastes en el material y la muerte de tres combatientes saharauis. La rapidez con la que intervinieron los marroquíes indica que habían obtenido, gracias a las coordenadas geográficas ofrecidas por los americanos, la posición exacta de los misiles saharauis. El jefe de la unidad, Omar Bulsán, hoy Secretario General del Ministerio de Información, estaba lejos de adivinar que detrás de ese ataque estaban la CIA americana.


Transcripción de los cables americanos que delataban la posición de los misiles antiaéreos saharauis


21 diciembre 1981

Western Sahara : Guerrillas move SA-6 missiles

Polisario Front guerrillas have moved SA-6 surface-to-air missile equipment east of the Moroccan-built defensive barrier in Western Sahara. (...)

Over the past month, the guerrillas have harassed Moroccan positions along the defensive linewith artillery fire, ans they may have brought in the SA-6 system to support a larger attack. Rabat expects the insurgents to attempt to breach tha barrier and has been sending reinforcements to the area. (...)

---------------------------------------

Remarks : The SA-6 equipment at Ain El Ben Polisario camp 2 had been removed (...) probably as a result of a Moroccam ais strike (...) at leas four bomb craters, new since (...) were at there southwestern edge of the camp. Only one heavy-lift transporter, without prime mover, eas observed at the camp on (...) (not on graphic). At least two probable SA-6 trasnporter.erector.launcher (TEL), one SA-6 transloader, three heavy-lift transpoters with prime movers, ten trucks and three tents were in this area (...) (one SA-6 transloader, one heavy-lift transporter and one tent are on graphic). Ain El Ben is 65 NM East of Semara.

(...)

(...) coordinates 26-43-19N 010-26-27W

------------------------------------------------

7 enero 1982

Moroccan airstrike

Bir Lehmar Polisario camp 8. Western Sahara

1. (S/D) Significance : The Moroccan air force has launched additional attacks against Polisario camps in the Western Sahara

2. (S/D) REmarks: Three bomb craters are on the Northwest edge of the camo and two bomb craters outside the camo area. No damage to the buildings, structures, or revetted bunkers is evident. Equipment has been dispersed throughout the camp ans includes fice trucks, one trailer, seven camouflages probable vehicles, and two vehicles/pieces of equipment.

3. (...) Coordinates 26-00-05N 010-58-50W

-----------------

4 febrero 1982

Probable SA-6 equipment

Ain El Ben, Western Sahara

Significane : probable SA-6 equipment has been identified at a New Polisario camp in Western Sahara.

Remarks : Probable SA-6 equipment was observed at the newly identified Ain El Ben Polisario camp 3 in Western Sahara, on Senior Look Imagey (...) one probable SA-6 transporter-erector. launcher (TEL), and one probable missile check-out tent 8graphic) were dispersed within the camp. The TEL ans missile check-out tente were 2 NM apart. Three SA-6 associated heavy-lift transpoters (graphic 2) were parked 6 NM South, at 26-47-15N 010-44-33W. Other equipment (not on graphic) at the new camp, which is dispersed along a 6-NM section of dry river bed, includes a large POL truck, seven large tents, six trucks, tents and deployment pattern is similar to that observed at Ain El Ben Polisario camp 2 (....) 14NM Southeast of this new camp, where SA-6 equipment was observed (...) Ain El Ben Polisario camp 2 has been vacant (...) Ain El Ben is 65 NM east of Semara.

(S) (...) coordinates 26-51-30N 010-41-35W

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4 febrero 1982

BM-11 Multiple rocket launcher zith Polisario forces Aain Um Serusa, Western Sahara

1. (S/D) Significance : Identification of BM-11 multiple rocket launcher with the Polisaro in Western Sahara with the Polisario in Western Sahara provides additional evidence of libyan support to the Polisario.

2. S/D) Remarks : Two BM-11 multiple rocket launchers (MRL) (one on graphic) were deployed in two separate wadis, approximately 1 NM south of the newly identified Aain Un Serua Polisario camp in Western Sahara.

(...) In addition, apptoximately 30 crates (graphic 2) probble containing BM-11 rockets were immediately north of the MRL. Other equipmente (not on graphic) includes 10 trucks and a bus. This is the first identification of BM-11 MRL with Polisario forces in Western Sahara. However, BM-11 were identified on (...) at Oued Tatrat Polisario camp nº 2 (...) Algeria, a knozn logistics support base for Polisario in Western Sahara.

(S/D) The presence of the BM-11 in Western Sahara provides additional evidence of libyan involvement with the Polisario. The BM-11, a north korean-produced rocket launcher, is presently known to be in the inentory of only Libya and Egypt in North Africa. Aain Un serusa is 75 NM East of Semara.

3. (S) (...) Coordinates 26-40-30N 010-16-20W

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6 febrero 1982

SA-6 Firing unit 

Ain El Ben Polisario camp, Western Sahara

1. (S/D) Significance : First photographic confirmation of a complete SA-6 firing unit with Polisario forces in Western Sahara.

2. (S/D) Remarks : The identification of a stright flush radar (in travel mode) with the SA-6 transporter-erector-launcher (TEL) (...) imagery confirma the presence of an SA-6 unit at Ain El Ben Polisario camp in Western Sahara, other SA-6 equipment (non on graphic) includes one probable SA-6 TEL, and one SA-6 canister transporter (with canisters), probable SA-6 equipment was first identified at this camp.

3. (S) (...) Coordinates 26-51-30N 010-41-35W

---------------------------------------------

6 febrero 

Extension of moroccan defensive berm into Mauritania 

Western Sahara / Mauritania (S)

1. Significance : Senior Look Imagery (...) revealed that an extension of the Moroccan-built defensive berm has penetrated Mauritanian territory up to 3 NM. (S)

2. REmarks : The berm extension, which originates south of Uad Bucraa, Western Sahara, proceeds southeast and enters Mauritanian territory at approximately 25-59-00N 012-00-00W. From the border the new extension follows an Easterly direction, roughly paralleling the Mauritania-Western Sahara border and penetrating up to 3 NM South into Mauritanian territory. At Annabca Polisario deployment (...) the berm extension then turns ans proceeds North as far as 26-11-30N 011-33-00W. (Annabca Polisario deployment has been vacated by Polisario forces.) (S)

Analyst's comments: The extension of the defensive berm into Mauritania territory will force Polisario military units deployed in the Western Sahara to utilize Mauritanian territory as they move from the Northeastern to southerm portions of the Western Sahara.

3. Be none, coordinates none (U)

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25 febrero 1982

SA-9 missile system

Ain El Ben Polisario camp 3, Western Sahara

1. (S/D) Significance : This is the second SA-9 missile transporter-erector-launcher (TEL) ideintified with the Polisario forces in Western Sahara.

2. (S/D) Remarks : Imagery or Ain El Ben Polisario camp 3 on (...) revealed the presence of one SA-9 TEL in addition to the SA-6 firing unit (not on graphic) first confirmed here.

(...) The SA-9 was parked in a dry river bed in the Northeast section of the camp. This is the second SA-9 TEL identified with Polisario forces. The first sighting was at Raudat El Hach military facility (...) and the SA-9 TELL still (...)

The SA-9 is a short range, fair weather, low-to-medium altitude tactical air defense missile mounted on a modified BRDM-2 armored amphibious vehicle (see insert). Ain El Ben Polisario camp 3 is 50 NM East of Smara. (...)

3. (S) (...) Coordinates 26-51-30N 010-41-35W

------------------------------------------------------------------

26 febrero 1982

Subject : Royal Moroccan Air Force (RMAF) Electronic Warfare (EW) support (U)

Background:

(S) The United States Government has previously approved sale of the URL-666 radar warning reciever (RWR) to the Government of Morocco, General Instrument Corporation of Hicksville, New York holds the munitions control license. Recently, the GOM has requested assistance from the United States in countering the SA-6 due to loss of several RMAF aircraft to this hostime system.

(S) Specifically, the RWR zill have to be programmes with (...). The follozing parametric data from the Electronic Warfare Integrated Reprogrammins data base would be used:

(...)

(S) A 20 January 1982 message from MUSLO, Rabat Morocco stated that ambassador Reed, MUSLO, General Instruments and Col-Maj Kabbaj, Chief RMAF met on 18 January 1982 to discuss the ULR-666 modification. The RMAF again requested the SA-6 and Gundish data.

Requested action :

(S) Request approval for threat data release to the US contrator onlu, General Instrument Corporation, for programming the ULR-666 RWR. The request is for initial ans recurring release on any threat which is validated by USAF, NSA and DIA.

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13 julio 1983

Proable SA-6 transporter-erector-launcher

Western Sahara (SWN)

1. Significance : On imagery of (...) one probable SA-6 transporter-erector-launcher (TEL) was identified in the Western Sahara for the first time since Apris 1982. (SWN)

2. Remarks : One probable SA-6 TEL was parked in a Wadi between Ain El Ben Polisario camp 2 (...) ans Uad Ternit camp (...) no other SA-6 related equipment was identified. Fifteen to 29 armored vehicles ans 10 trucks or Land-Rover type vehicles were present at this location on (...)

The SA-6 surface.to-air missile system was first identified in Western Sahara at Ain El Ben Polisario camp 2 on (...) 8SWN)

3. Be none, coordinates 26-43-15N 010-26-24W

------------------------------

31 agosto 1983

Vacation of Polisario camps

Western Sahara (SWN)

Significance : Polisario units have departed three base camps, possibly in preparation for attacks on moroccan positions

(SWN)

2. REmarks : At Ain Arjamis Polisario camp 2, at least 14 armored vehicles (mostly BTR-60) and 29 trucks were out of garrison. At Aain Erjamis Polisario camp 4, four armored vehicles had departed. At Gart Achor Polisario camp, two had also departed. These camps had been occupies in mid.august. Prior to the Polisario attack against the Moroccam berm at Messeied, which lasted (...) to early august, units from these camps were missing and probably participated in the attack. (SWN)

3. (...) coordinates 26-18-20N 011-10-06W (S)

(...) Coordinates 26-16-30N 011-10-30W (S)

(...) Coordinates 27-07-00N 010-25-00W (S)

--------------------------------

Significane : Polisario forces have deployed probable SA-6 equipment in the Messeied area.

Remarks : A firing position with two probable SA-6 transporter-erector-launchers (TEL) ans one probable straight flush radar is at 27-52N 010-40W. This position is just inside Morocco approximately 10 NM southeast of Messeied, which is the northerm point of the moroccan defensive berm. A small security force of seven probable land.rover type vehicules is around the position. The probable SA-6 equipment appears to be operational: SA-6 equipment has not previously been seen in Morocco; however an SA-6 TEL was seen on (...) at Uad Ternit Polisario camp (...) in Western Sahara, approximately 85 NM South-Southeast of Messeied.

(...) Coordinates 27-50-00N 010-36-00W

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